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Abstract
This paper uses macro-networks to measure the interconnectedness of the banking sector,
and relates it to banking crises in Europe. Beyond cross-border financial linkages of the
banking sector, macro-networks also account for financial linkages to the other main
financial and non-financial sectors within the economy. We enrich conventional early-
warning models using macro-financial vulnerabilities, by including network measures of
banking sector as potential determinants of banking crises. Our results show that a
more central position of the banking sector in the macro-network significantly increases
the probability of a banking crisis. By analyzing the different types of risk exposures,
our evidence shows that credit is an important source of vulnerability. Finally, the
results show that early-warning models augmented with interconnectedness measures
outperform traditional models in terms of out-of-sample predictions of recent banking
crises in Europe.
JEL classification: F36, G20
Keywords: Financial interconnectedness, Macro-networks, Banking crises,
Early-warning model
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Non Technical Summary
The global financial crisis underlines the need for novel tools to support macro-
prudential and regulatory policies. This paper uses macro-networks to measure financial
interconnectedness of the banking sector with the aim to explain and predict banking
crises in Europe. By including measures of centrality of the banking system in the
early-warning model, we are able to account for the potential shock transmissions and
exposures to vulnerabilities that a banking sector could face through its domestic and
cross-border interconnections. Our paper contributes to the existing literature on fi-
nancial networks by assessing the role of financial linkages, constructed over aggregate
balance sheets, and provides an additional set of indicators to the early-warning litera-
ture.
Our framework builds on the early-warning literature, which aims to identify vul-
nerable states preceding crises using a wide range of country-level macro, financial and
banking sector indicators. It is also related to the financial network literature, which
have been used to investigate contagion and spillover mechanisms. By combining these
two strands of literature, our analysis evaluates the usefulness of network indicators to
detect banking crises and shows that financial models should not ignore the interactions
of the banking sector with other sectors of the economy.
The paper models the intricate web of financial linkages as a network. Using aggre-
gate balance sheets, we construct both the cross-border banking linkages and the linkages
of the banking system with the other institutional sectors of the economy. The resulting
framework, denominated as macro-network, includes 14 European countries and allows
us to identify the position of the banking sector of each country using network centrality
measures. Then, we test whether and to what extent the computed network metrics are
significant explanatory variables of pre-crisis periods and improve the predictive capabil-
ities of standard models.
The paper has the following main findings: First, we find that a more central position
of the banking sector in the macro-network increases the probability of a banking crisis.
Second, our evidence indicates that the macro-network characterizes the position of a
banking sector in a more refined way than if one considers solely the cross-border network
of banking sectors. Third, our results show that early-warning models augmented with
macro-networks outperform traditional models in terms of predicting recent banking
crises in Europe out-of-sample. We test the robustness of the results with respect to
financial instruments, the chosen forecast horizon, thresholds on issuing a signal and the
specified preferences between issuing false alarms and missing crises.
While the paper relies on a stylized framework, we believe that the macro-network is
an important step toward a more comprehensive understanding of the linkages between
the banking sector and the other non-financial sectors from the financial stability per-
spective. In particular, for the study of banking crises, we consider it to be important
to take into account the potential shock transmissions and exposures to vulnerabilities
that banking sector could face through its domestic and cross-border interconnections.
ECB Working Paper 1866, November 2015 2
1. Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has stimulated a wave of research to better un-
derstand sources of systemic risk and potential determinants of financial crises. Two
strands of literature have emerged: one stressing the identification of risks that build-up
over time and another investigating the cross-sectional dimension of vulnerabilities. This
paper combines the two approaches to explore whether complementing macro-financial
indicators with measures of financial interconnectedness aid in explaining and predict-
ing recent banking crises in Europe. By including measures of centrality of the banking
system in the early-warning model, we are able to account for the potential shock trans-
missions and exposures to vulnerabilities that a banking sector could face through its
domestic and cross-border interconnections. European countries seem an ideal laboratory
for our empirical investigation given the central role that the banking sector plays in Eu-
ropean economies in intermediating funds for the real economy, and as the introduction
of the single currency has substantially increased the financial integration, potentially
increasing cross-border spillover effects.
The early-warning literature has focused on the time-dimension of systemic risk, by
identifying vulnerable states preceding financial crises using a wide range of country-level
macro, financial and banking sector indicators.1 The literature has focused on the de-
terminants of banking crises through the analysis of univariate indicators (i.e., signaling
approach Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998) and multivariate models (see e.g. Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1997; Eichengreen and Rose, 1998). In general, periods prior to
systemic banking crises have been shown to be explained by traditional vulnerabilities
and risks that represent imbalances like lending booms and asset price misalignments.
By an analysis of univariate indicators, Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004) show that banking
crises tend to be preceded by strong deviations of credit and asset prices from their trend.
Alessi and Detken (2011) show that best-performing indications of boom/bust cycles are
given by liquidity in general and the global private credit gap in particular. Likewise,
in a multivariate regression setting, vulnerabilities and risks have, overall, been shown
to precede country-level crises on a large sample of developed and developing countries
in Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) and for the US, Colombia and Mexico in
Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1999), as well as on a bank level in Eastern European transi-
tion economies in Ma¨nnasoo and Mayes (2009). Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) show that
modern financial crises have been preceded by a range of domestic macro-financial vul-
nerabilities and risks, particularly credit growth, equity valuations and leverage. Their
analysis also emphasizes the importance of global financial developments, such as global
liquidity and asset price developments impacting a domestic vulnerability to financial
crisis (for a further discussion on global liquidity see also Cerutti et al., 2014). This only
provides a snapshot of the broad literature that aims to detect and proxy imbalances,
risks and vulnerabilities that function as determinants of crises, with the ultimate goal
of identifying vulnerable states preceding crises.
Another strand of a rapidly expanding literature analyzes the cross-sectional dimen-
sion of systemic risk. Beyond country-level vulnerabilities, the recent crisis propagated
1The literature acknowledges the challenges in predicting shocks that trigger crises, but rather aims
at identifying states when entities are vulnerable to the occurrence of triggers. See Lang et al. (2015)
for an overview of the early-warning literature and a modelling framework.
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across markets and borders, and the banking system played a major role in this phe-
nomenon. Adverse shocks have been exacerbated via balance sheet effects, causing insol-
vencies and substantial losses.2 Recently, cross-border linkages and interdependencies of
the international financial system have been modeled using network techniques. Start-
ing with the analysis of the international trade flows as a network (Fagiolo et al., 2009,
2010), these techniques have been applied to other contexts. Kubelec and Sa´ (2010)
and Sa (2010) represent a large dataset of bilateral cross-border exposures by asset class
(FDI, portfolio equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves) for 18 advanced and emerg-
ing market economies as a network. Minoiu and Reyes (2013) study the features of the
global banking network.3 More generally, both theoretical and empirical works show that
network techniques provide useful insights with respect to financial stability. Previous
literature finds that network structure matters in the generation of systemic risk (Allen
et al., 2011). Network topology influences contagion (e.g., Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Georg,
2013). Also, network measures have been related to changes of the global banking system
(Minoiu and Reyes, 2013), as well as to economic growth and financial contagion (Kali
and Reyes, 2010).
In this paper, we study the intricate web of financial linkages with the aim to de-
tect vulnerability to banking crises. We consider the cross-border banking linkages in a
network architecture to measure the extent of the direct and indirect exposures of each
country's banking sector to the international banking system. On top of that, using
the Euro Area Accounts (EAA), each banking system is linked to the other institu-
tional sectors of the economy. To include both aspects in our analysis, i.e., country-level
and sector-level linkages, we build on the framework proposed by Castre´n and Rancan
(2014). They introduce the idea of a macro-network, a network representing the financial
positions which links the institutional sectors of the economy, including both financial
sectors (banks, insurance companies, pension funds and other financial intermediaries),
and non-financial sectors (non-financial corporations, government, households and the
rest of the world). Thus, the macro-network provides a mapping of the balance sheet
exposures and the associated financial risks in a comprehensive framework. As a large
part of the financing is intermediated through banks, particularly in Europe, our focus
is on the banking sector. While in studying macroeconomic fluctuations through input-
output analysis firm-level shocks seem to spread along relatively predictable patters,4
when looking at the banking sector there are additional challenges. Banks’ balance sheet
are exposed to multiple sources of risks and the various exposures can act as a trans-
mission channel of shocks. With the aim to understand the relationship of the banking
sector with different types of risks and the different role played by the banking sector
–either as a direct holder or as an intermediary– the macro-network is constructed using
the different financial instruments: loans, deposits, securities and shares. There are sev-
eral important differences across the financial instruments that should be noted, such as
2For instance, Adrian and Shin (2010) show how balance sheets may be a conduit of shock propaga-
tion. In Caballero and Simsek (2013) fire sales of assets amplify contagion effects.
3A rapidly growing finance literature has focused on banking networks using data at bank-level, such
as stable interbank lending (e.g., Mistrulli, 2011; Craig and von Peter, 2014), overnight interbank lending
(Iori et al., 2008), and syndicated loans (e.g., Hale, 2012; Cai et al., 2011; Godlewski et al., 2012). Unlike
these papers, our network is at macro-level and incorporates different economic sectors of the economy.
4Acemoglu et al. (2015a) show that supply-side shocks propagate mainly downstream, while demand
shocks propagate mainly upstream.
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the banking sector having a dominant position in loans and deposits. While the bank-
ing sector can hold securities and shares directly in its portfolio, it can also act as an
intermediary of these instruments to other institutional sectors. Further, only certain
institutional sectors issue securities and shares, limiting the banking sector’s direct risk
exposures to certain sectors. The instruments also capture exposures to different types of
risk, such as loans to credit risk, deposits to funding and liquidity risk, and also securities
and shares to market risk. To identify the position of the banking sector of each country
we make use of network centrality measures. Combining the topics of macro-financial
imbalances and networks, this paper explores whether complementing standard macro-
financial vulnerabilities with network centralities computed on the macro-network aids
in explaining and predicting the occurrence of banking crises. As we control for more
standard early-warning indicators, we can test whether and to what extent the computed
network metrics are significant explanatory variables of pre-crisis periods and improve
the predictive capabilities of standard models. Moreover, the macro-network allows us to
display the patterns of asset and liability positions over time and to monitor imbalances
or fragilities in the domestic and foreign portfolios.
Our findings suggest that a more central position of the banking sector in the macro-
network increases the probability of a banking crisis. Our analysis also indicates that the
macro-network provides a more correct characterization of a banking sector’s position
in terms of financial linkages than if one solely considers a banking sector’s cross-border
exposures. Thus, this paper shows that financial models cannot ignore the interactions of
the banking sector with other sectors of the economy. In this context, among the different
types of risks faced by banks, those originated from the lending, i.e. credit risk, and, to
some extent, investment activities through market risk seem to predict more accurately
banking crises. Finally, our results show that early-warning models augmented with
macro-networks outperform traditional models in terms of predicting recent banking
crises in Europe out-of-sample. We test the robustness of the results with respect to
the chosen forecast horizon, thresholds on issuing a signal and the specified preferences
between issuing false alarms and missing crises. Further, the paper is complemented with
a web-based interactive visualization of the macro-networks: http://vis.risklab.fi/
#/macronet/ (for a further discussion of the VisRisk platform see Sarlin (2014)).
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on networks by assessing the role of
financial linkages, constructed over aggregate balance sheets, and provides an additional
set of indicators to the early-warning literature. Few recent papers are close to our ap-
proach. Caballero (2015) investigates the level of financial integration measured in the
global banking network, using detailed information on bank exposures in the syndicated
loan market, as determinants of bank crises. Chinazzi et al. (2013) relate the 2008-2009
crisis to a global banking network built with data on cross-border portfolio investment
holdings. In a similar vein, Minoiu et al. (2015) show the usefulness of network measures,
computed over the web of international banking exposures (the BIS bilateral locational
statistics), for crisis prediction. Differently, in our analysis the banking sector is con-
sidered as one of the sectors in the broad architecture of the financial system. In this
respect, our paper is related to Billio et al. (2012) who consider financial connectedness
between a larger set of financial institutions, like insurer corporations, brokers, and hedge
funds, in addition to banking institutions.5 But they focus on individual institutions,
5Their measures are based on PCA and Granger causality. Recently other econometric approaches
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while we consider balance-sheet exposures for sectors at aggregate level, additional sec-
tors and multiple countries. Our framework is also related to some recent works using
cross-holdings or input-output linkages to evaluate aggregate effects of shocks originating
from firms or disaggregated sectors (Cabrales et al., 2014; Elliott et al., 2014; Acemoglu
et al., 2015a,b). This paper complements previous literature by analyzing centrality us-
ing not only loans, but also the other largest financial instruments, and identifying the
corresponding financial risks. While our representation of the financial linkages is a styl-
ized characterization of the financial interconnectedness existing in Europe, we believe
that this approach is a step further toward a more comprehensive understanding of the
banking sector as part of a system and the financial stability risks.
The paper is organized as follows. After discussing the underlying data, we present the
techniques used for creating and evaluating the early-warning models. Then, we present
and discuss the early-warning models as well as the findings about macro-networks as
determinants of financial crises. Before concluding, we perform an extensive robustness
analysis.
2. Data
For the analysis, we need three categories of data: crisis events, macro-financial early-
warning indicators and macro-networks. This section explains how the necessary data
is derived. After merging all datasets, our quarterly sample covers the period 2000q1–
2012q1 for 14 European countries.6
2.1. Crisis events
The first set of data needed are dates of systemic banking crises. The banking crisis
events used in this paper are based upon the compilation initiative by Babecky et al.
(2014) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) Heads of Research. In partic-
ular, the database includes banking crisis events for all EU countries from 1970 to 2012
on a quarterly frequency. The approach in Babecky et al. (2014) involves a compilation
of banking crisis dates from a large number of influential papers, including Laeven and
Valencia (2013), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), which
have been further complemented and cross-checked by ESCB Heads of Research. Hence,
it tries to align with previous literature at the same time as cross-country differences are
accounted for through more qualitative assessment by a survey among country experts.
A binary crisis variable takes the value 1 in case an event occurs and 0 otherwise. Yet,
in order to identify vulnerable states prior to crises, we specify the dependent variable to
take the value 1 during a specified pre-crisis time window prior to the crisis events, and
0 otherwise. While the benchmark time window is 24 months, we also test performance
using a number of specifications with shorter and longer horizons. The used sample
includes 128 quarters of systemic banking crises and 104 quarters of pre-crisis periods.7
have been adopted to quantify financial linkages (Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014).
6Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
7The crisis periods are as follows: Austria, 2008Q1; Belgium, 2008Q3–4; Germany, 2quarters008Q1–
4; France, 2008Q3–2012Q1; Greece, 2008Q1–2012Q1; Ireland, 2008Q3–2012Q1; Netherlands, 2008Q3–
2012Q1; Portugal, 2008Q4–2012Q1; Denmark 2008Q3–4; Great Britain, 2007Q3–2012Q1; Sweden, 2008–
2010.
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Further, we define post-crisis periods to be a specific horizon (1 year) after crises and
the periods that do not belong to any of the previously mentioned states as tranquil
periods. This gives us three states around systemic banking crises: pre-crisis, post-crisis
and tranquil periods.
2.2. Early-warning indicators
The second set of data needed are country-level indicators of risks, vulnerabilities and
imbalances. We make use of standard indicators measuring macro-financial and banking-
sector conditions. This paper follows a number of works in order to control for the most
commonly used risk and vulnerability indicators, with the ultimate aim of testing the
usefulness of macro-networks as leading indicators.
We cover two types of country-specific indicators (see Table B3 in Appendix B). First,
we make use of country-specific macro-financial indicators to identify macro-economic
imbalances and to control for conjunctural variation in asset prices and business cycles.
The paper controls for macro-economic imbalances by using internal and external vari-
ables from the EU Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), such as the international
investment position, government debt and its yield and private sector credit flow. Fur-
ther, we capture conjunctural variation with indicators measuring asset prices, including
growth rates of stock and house prices, and business cycle variables, such as growth of
real GDP and CPI inflation. Most of the macro-financial data are sourced from Euro-
stat and Bloomberg. Second, we use country-specific indicators of banking sectors for
identifying imbalances in banking systems. With the indicators, we aim at proxying for
the following types of aggregate risks and imbalances in banking systems: balance-sheet
booms, securitization, property booms and leverage. Indicators used in the paper are
constructed using the ECB’s statistics on the Balance Sheet Items (BSI) of the Monetary,
Financial Institutions and Markets.
2.3. Macro-networks
We require a third set of data to be able to compute macro-networks. While compu-
tational details are discussed in Section 3.1, we focus herein on describing the two data
sources necessary for computing macro-networks. First, we use the euro area accounts
(EAA) data at the individual country level. The EAA provide a record of financial trans-
actions in terms of assets and liabilities, broken down into instrument categories, for the
various institutional sectors. Those data allow us to estimate8 the financial linkages at do-
mestic level between the institutional sectors: non-financial corporations (NFC); banks
(monetary financial institutions, MFI); insurance and pension fund companies (INS);
other financial intermediaries (OFI); general government (GOV); households (HH); and
the rest of the world (ROW). The EAA are available on a quarterly basis for a set of
European countries. Second, we use the Balance Sheet Items statistics (BSI); those data
provide the aggregated (or consolidated) balance sheets of the countrys MFI sector and
provide information on MFI counterparties at the country level to identify the MFI’s
cross-country exposures.
8Currently, whom-to-whom flow-of-funds statistics are available only for few countries and for selected
instruments (deposits, short-term and long-term loans). Therefore, we need to estimate the sectoral flows
at the domestic level using methods described in Section 3.1. We use, however, the information of the
whom-to-whom flow-of-funds statistics for the available instruments to cross check the robustness of the
estimated macro network (see Appendix A).
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3. Methods
This section presents the methodology for constructing the macro-networks, estima-
tion and prediction techniques to derive early-warning signals, and evaluation techniques
for assessing the usefulness of the early-warning signals.
3.1. Construction of the macro-network
In this section, we describe how the macro-network is constructed. In general, a
network is defined as a set of nodes and a set of linkages between them. In our context,
each banking sector, as well as each institutional sector, is considered as a node indexed by
i, and the total number of nodes N is 98 (7 sectors × 14 countries). A financial relation
between any two sectors is a linkage wij , which is directed and weighted. Linkages
are constructed in the following way: i) domestic linkages between sectors, denoted by
superscript D, are estimated using the EAA data, and ii) cross-border linkages between
banking sectors, denoted by superscript CB, are the actual data recorded in the BSI
statistics. In detail, we obtain the domestic network WD by using the total amount of
assets and liabilities for all seven sectors of the economy, and applying the maximum
entropy method for each country. The maximum entropy works as follows. Assets a and
liabilities l can be interpreted as realizations of the marginal distributions f(a) and f(b),
and the WD as their joint distribution. The common approach is to assume that f(a) and
f(b) are independent, which implies that bilateral linkages are given by a simple solution
wDij = ailj . Hence, the institutional sectors maximize the dispersion of their linkages.
9
The maximum entropy is a method borrowed from the literature analyzing contagion
risk in the interbank market, where the algorithm is applied at the level of individual
institutions (for a review see Upper, 2011). More recent literature has proposed other
methods for estimating linkages to represent incomplete and tiering structures of the
interbank market (e.g., Anand et al., 2015), but here it is reasonable that each sector has
at least some financial transactions with the other sectors and that the degree distribution
is not highly skewed. Hence, we opt for the maximum entropy method which seems the
most appropriate approach given the features of our context.10
The set of cross-border linkages WCB , connecting the MFI sectors, comes from the
BSI statistics which reports the whom-to-whom information. Considering both domestic
linkages between sectors for all countries and the cross-border linkages between banking
sectors, the resulting network of linkages, W = WD + WCB , is the macro-network and
it is constructed in each period and for each balance sheet instrument. Figure 1 shows
an example of the macro-network for securities for period Q1 2012. Nodes are identified
by the abbreviation of sectors, and different colors help to identify sectors in different
countries. The size of each arrow approximates the euro volume of a linkage. Although
linkages are rescaled using logarithm, one can notice that there is a substantial variation
across linkages connecting sectors, which capture the heterogeneous financial structure
of different countries. The macro-network includes cross-border linkages between the
9In our setting the diagonal matrix is not set equal zero as financial transactions may take place
between institutions of the same sector.
10To be more precise, we use an improved algorithm of the maximum-entropy method, which takes
into account additional information regarding the network structure. For further details regarding the
approach, see Castre´n and Rancan (2014).
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banking sectors, in Europe indeed banks play a crucial role as intermediaries in the
cross-border flows. In contrast, in the macro-network financial linkages between the
banking sector and the foreign non-banking sectors are not directly modelled due to the
absence of comprehensive data and the persistent level of segmentation in the European
financial system.11
In order to analyse the robustness of the estimated macro-network, we use the (lim-
ited) available information of the whom-to-whom flow-of-funds statistics for the available
instruments and perform comparison tests (see Appendix A). The analysis on the net-
work structure, linkages, and centrality measures indicates that the chosen methodology
seems appropriate in this context. Overall, the macro-network provides a representation
of the interconnectedness of the European financial system.
11Data that could provide some information are often only partial, limited in the time series and
inconsistent with the EAA. Nonetheless, all cross-border exposures, besides those between banking
sectors, are somehow incorporated in our framework with the linkages to/from the sector ‘rest of the
world sector’ without specifying the counterparty sector-country.
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Figure 1: The European macro-network visualized in VisRisk (http://vis.risklab.fi/#/macronet/).
The figure illustrates the macro-network for debt security instrument at Q1 2012q1, for fourteen Eu-
ropean countries and sectors non-financial corporations (NFC), banks (monetary financial institutions,
MFI), insurance and pension fund companies (INS), other financial intermediaries (OFI), general gov-
ernment (GOV), households (HH), and the rest of the world (ROW). We use VisRisk’s force-directed
layouting algorithms for positioning nodes. Colors refer to different countries and the link opacity dis-
plays the size of the real/estimated transactions among sectors.
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3.2. Measuring banking sector centrality
For the study of banking crises, it is important to take into account the potential shock
transmissions and exposures to vulnerabilities that a banking sector could face through
its domestic and cross-border interconnections. In order to quantify the interconnections
and position of each country’s banking sector relative to all other financial and non-
financial sectors of the economy as well as to other cross-border banking sectors, we
calculate a set of commonly used network centrality measures. In particular, we use
centrality measures that provide a useful quantification of the individual position of each
node relative to the network. By measuring direct linkages, In-Degree (Out-Degree) is the
sum of all incoming (outgoing) linkages that each node has. Betweenness measures the
extent to which a particular node lies “between” the other nodes in the network in terms
of shortest weighted paths. Closeness is a measure of influence, where the most central
node in the network can reach all other nodes quickly.12 Betweenness and Closeness take
into account both direct and indirect linkages capturing the position of a node in the
overall network.
We compute the above four centrality measures for four instruments available using
the quarter-end balance sheet: loans, deposits, securities and shares. In order to avoid
merely taking into account size effects, we use the logarithm transformation of the link-
ages W , and consider the weighted version of the above metrics as financial linkages
differ in their volumes. Basic summary statistics are reported in Table 1 (and Table B1
in Appendix B). Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the centrality measures. The charts
show that the network measures vary both over time (upper panel) and across countries
(lower panel), however these variations depend on the specific instrument and centrality
measure. Nonetheless, we find that network measures as well as various instruments
for which they are computed, are highly correlated. Thus, we use Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) –a technique in which the centrality measures can be decomposed into
orthogonal factors having decreasing explanatory variance– to reduce the number of po-
tential variables to be included in the early-warning model, while still retaining most of
the variance in the measures. A common procedure when using PCA is to retain compo-
nents with eigenvalues greater than one. We do so, but also consider results with a larger
number of principal components to assess improvements in early-warning performance.
Table B4 shows the PCA results for the centrality measures across all instruments to-
gether (Panel A) and for the set of centrality measures for each individual instrument
(Panel B).
3.3. Estimation and prediction
In the early-warning literature, a broad selection of different methods have been used
for estimating crisis probabilities (for an extensive review and comparison see Holopainen
and Sarlin, 2015). From the family of discrete-choice methods, we make use of standard
logit analysis, and follow the literature by preferring pooled models (e.g., Fuertes and
Kalotychou, 2007; Kumar et al., 2003; Davis and Karim, 2008). In particular, when
Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) account for time- and country-specific effects, they show
that it leads to better in-sample fit, with the cost of decreased out-of-sample performance.
Further, one can also argue for pooling by the rarity of crises in individual countries, while
12See Table B2 in Appendix B for the mathematical definitions.
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Table 1: Banking sector centrality measures on the macro-networks. The table reports the centrality
measures of the banking sectors for each country computed on the macro-networks. Centrality measures
are averaged by countries and time periods. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Loans Deposits Securities Shares All instruments
In-Degree 98.79 160.78 120.92 102.72 120.80
(25.31) (24.34) (33.86) (22.37) (36.36)
Out-Degree 151.68 109.13 118.26 81.32 115.10
(27.55) (24.49) (28.19) (28.18) (36.98)
Betweenness 383.27 369.05 990.09 1012.25 688.67
(259.47) (94.98) (295.82) (438.42) (432.09)
Closeness 56.78 22.66 43.33 29.47 38.06
(9.13) (3.29) (8.39) (6.85) (15.00)
models still strive to capture a wide variety of vulnerabilities. Thus, we do not control
for country or time-fixed effects, as this would otherwise drop observations for countries
or periods that do not experience a crisis. Instead of lagging explanatory variables, we
define the dependent variable as a forecast horizon that includes a specified number of
quarters prior to the event (8 quarters in the benchmark case). In order to account
for so-called crisis and post-crisis bias (e.g., Bussire and Fratzscher, 2006; Sarlin and
Peltonen, 2013), we exclude crisis and post-crisis periods from the estimation sample.
As economic variables go through adjustment processes prior to reaching tranquil paths
in times of crisis and recovery, these periods are not informative for identifying the path
from pre-crisis regimes to crisis. Further, to control for potential correlation in the error
terms (see e.g. Behn et al. (2013)), we derive robust standard errors by clustering at the
level of time units. The correlation in error terms is particularly relevant in our case,
as macro-network based measures tend to be correlated across countries, allowing us to
better control for the global nature of the effects.
Rather than describing the problem from the viewpoint of time-series prediction,
the focus on differentiating between vulnerable (i.e., pre-crisis) and tranquil economies
forms a standard classification problem. We are aiming for a model that separates
vulnerable and tranquil classes to classify (or discriminate) between them by estimating
the probability of being in a vulnerable state in any given case (also denoted as crisis
probability). That said, time needs to be accounted for when testing the predictive power
of an early-warning model. To measure predictive performance, we divide the dataset
into two samples: in-sample data and out-of-sample data. While the in-sample data
are used for estimation, the out-of-sample dataset measure the predictive power of the
estimated model. This is done in a recursive manner to mimic the set-up of a quasi
real-time analysis by using the information set available at each quarter. We control
for the indicators that would have been at hand, including the use of only data up to a
quarter and accounting for publication lags, but do not account for data revisions due
to lack of available public information. Another reason for the recursive exercises being
quasi real-time is that they use pre-crisis events for given quarters. This simplifying
assumption has to be made due to the shortness of Euro Area Accounts time series and
the lack of systemic events in the years prior to the current global wave of crises. While
this allows a leak of information about occurring crises slightly earlier, it provides still a
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Figure 2: Centrality measures. In the upper panel, the charts depict the trends of the centrality measures
of MFIs (in-degree, out-degree, betweenness and closeness) in the macro-networks. All measures are
averaged across MFIs for each instrument-year and normalized. In the lower panel, the charts depict
the trends over time of In-degree for each country-instrument.
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comparable relative recursive performance test of the models with and without measures
of interconnectedness.13
3.4. Evaluation of model signals
The above described problem is a classification task, yet logit analysis outputs a
probability forecast for each observation rather than crisply assigning them into classes.
For classification through probability forecasts, an essential part is the evaluation of the
results and the measures used for setting thresholds, or cut-off values, on the probabilities.
An evaluation framework that accounts for imbalanced class distributions and varying
misclassification costs plays a key role in this work, as crises may be described as low
probability, high-impact events. In the vein of the loss-function approach proposed by
Alessi and Detken (2011), the framework applied here follows an updated version in Sarlin
(2013). We derive a loss function and Usefulness measure for a cost-aware decision maker
with class-specific misclassification costs.
Let an ideal leading indicator be represented with a binary state variable Ij ∈ {0, 1},
where the index j = 1, 2, , N represents observations and h a forecast horizon. Hence, Ij
takes the value 1 within the forecast horizon prior to a crisis, and 0 otherwise. We use
logit analysis to turn multivariate data into probability forecasts of a crisis pj ∈ {0, 1}.
For classification, the probabilities pj need to be transformed into binary point forecasts
pj ∈ {0, 1} that equal one if pj exceed a specified threshold λ and zero otherwise. The
frequencies of prediction-realization combinations between Pj and Ij can be summarized
into a contingency matrix consisting of: false positives (FP), true positives (TP), false
negatives (FN) and true negatives (TN).
A wide range of goodness-of-fit measures can be computed from entries of a con-
tingency matrix.14 These do not, however, tackle imbalances in class size and class
cost. We approach the problem from the viewpoint of a policymaker that is concerned
of conducting two types of errors: type 1 and 2 errors. Type 1 errors represent the
conditional probability P (pj ≤ λ | Ij(h) = 1), and type 2 errors the conditional prob-
ability P (pj > λ | Ij(h) = 0). When estimated from data, they can be computed as
the share of false negatives to all positives (T1 = FN/(FN + TP )) and false positives
to all negatives (T2 = FP/(FP + TN)), respectively. Hence, given probabilities pj , the
aim of the decision maker is to choose a threshold that minimizes her loss. To account
for imbalances in class size, the loss of a decision maker consists not only of T1 and
T2 but also of unconditional probabilities of positives P1 = P (Ij(h) = 1) and negatives
13For a further discussion on quasi vis-a`-vis truly real-time recursive estimations see Holopainen and
Sarlin (2015). Real-time use of pre-crisis periods may distort the true relationship between indicators and
vulnerable states, which could imply biased model selection, particularly variable selection. In contrast
to lags on the independent variables, one should also note that the treatment of pre-crisis periods does
not impact the latest available relationship in data and information set at each quarter.
14Some of the commonly used simple evaluation measures are as follows. Recall positives (or
TP rate) = TP/(TP+FN), Recall negatives (or TN rate) = TN/(TN+FP), Precision positives =
TP/(TP+FP), Precision negatives = TN/(TN+FN), Accuracy = (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN), FP
rate = FP/(FP+TN), and FN rate = FN/(FN+TP). Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves
and the area under the ROC curve (AUC) are also suitable for evaluating model performance. The
ROC curve shows the trade-off between the benefits and costs of a certain λ. The AUC measures the
probability that a randomly chosen distress event is ranked higher than a tranquil period. A coin toss
has an expected AUC of 0.5, whereas a perfect ranking has an AUC equal to 1.
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P2 = P (Ij(h) = 0) = 1−P1. The frequency-weighted errors are then further weighted by
policymakers’ relative preferences between missing a crisis µ ∈ [0, 1] and issuing a false
alarm 1 − µ, which may either be directly specified by the policymaker or derived from
a benefit/cost matrix. Finally, the loss function is as follows:
L(µ) = µT1P1 + (1− µ)T2P2 (1)
While this enables us to find an optimal threshold, we are still interested in the
Usefulness of the model. By always signalling a crisis if P1 > 0.5, or never signalling if
P2 > 0.5, a decision maker could achieve a loss of min(P1, P2). By accounting for the
above specified preference parameter µ, we achieve the relative Usefulness
Ua(µ) = min(µP1, (1− µ)P2)− L(µ) (2)
For an interpretable measure, we compute the amount of absolute Usefulness Ua that
the model captures in relation to the Usefulness of a perfect model
Ur(µ) =
Ua(µ)
min(µP1, (1− µ)P2) , (3)
While relative Usefulness Ur is simply a rescaled measure of Ua, the value of it is to
provide a meaningful interpretation. With Ur, performance can be compared in terms
of percentage points. Hence, we can focus mainly on Ur when interpreting models.
4. Analysis
This section presents and discusses the early-warning models built in this paper,
and particularly tests the role of macro-networks as leading indicators. We look at this
from two viewpoints: i) macro-networks and its constituents as early-warning indicators,
and ii) the usefulness of different instruments in early-warning exercises. The analysis
is done as follows. First, we assess whether macro-network measures contain early-
warning information. Second, we assess the extent to which vulnerability descends from
cross-border linkages vis-a`-vis sectoral exposures. Third, we consider separately different
balance-sheet instruments that may convey different types of information, in order to
better understand which instruments contain most vulnerabilities.
4.1. Macro-networks as early-warning indicators
In order to evaluate the performance of models, we need to specify the policymakers
preferences between type I and II errors. We assume the policymaker to be more con-
cerned with missing a crisis than giving false alarms. This coincides with reasoning when
an alarm leads to an internal investigation rather than an external signal (which might
be related to more complex political economy effects). Hence, our benchmark preference
parameter is µ = 0.8.
In Table 2, model 1 is the baseline which includes standard indicators measuring
macro-financial and banking-sector conditions. By considering separately the different
balance-sheet instruments, we might lose useful information exhibited by other instru-
ments. Likewise, considering only a few of the correlated centrality measures might lead
to disregarding relevant information. Thus, we perform PCA on all network measures
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and instruments together (PCA-MN-All). Models 2–5 confirm the usefulness of aug-
menting the baseline specification with network information: one principal component
significantly increases performance. Adding more principal components increases early-
warning performance. Given that the eigenvalues and the explained variance of the third
and fourth components are similar, we choose model 5 as our benchmark. In model 5, all
components are statistically significant. However, our results are supported also by the
analysis of the individual network measures, which are always positive and statistically
significant in almost all cases (see Table B6). Thus, we opt for model 5 with the hope
to provide a tool which is parsimonious and informative at the same time. To illustrate
model output, Figure B1(a) shows estimated probabilities and the optimal threshold for
Ireland, for whom the model starts signaling in early 2005. Overall, the driving factor of
the early-warning performance is network measures that quantify the position of the each
banking sector with respect to all other banking sectors across Europe and non-banking
sectors in the domestic economy.
4.2. Cross-border banking networks as early-warning indicators
In this section, we investigate whether MFIs’ cross-border linkages would be useful
and sufficient to inform a policy maker. Similarly to the macro-network, we first model
the set of cross-border linkages WCB of MFIs as a network. Second we used a cross-
border network to derive centrality measures (Table B5 provides summary statistics) and
the corresponding PCAs.
In Table 3, Models 2–5 enrich standard early-warning indicators with the appropri-
ate number of PCAs for each balance sheet instrument, Models 6–7 include the PCAs
constructed considering all centrality measures for all instruments together. The im-
provements in relative Usefulness indicate that Models 2–5, which add only individual
instruments, perform better than the baseline model with no network measures (Model
1). In Model 6, the relative Usefulness improves further, but does not reach same levels as
the macro-network in Table 2. We interpret this as an indication of the macro-network as
a more comprehensive characterization of the interconnectedness (or position) of a bank-
ing sector than if one considers solely the network of banking sectors (Chinazzi et al.,
2013; Minoiu et al., 2015). By definition, it allows for more channels of vulnerability,
as well as provides an explicit characterization of the closeness of the banking sector to
the real economy (e.g., households and non-financial corporations) that could potentially
increase the likelihood of banking distress becoming systemic. More precisely, we show
that centrality measures are better indicators of vulnerability when also accounting for
domestic sectoral exposures, in addition to cross-border linkages.15
This is an interesting finding given that data on all the existing cross-border connec-
tions between all sectors, such as linkages between households and non-financial sectors
in various countries, are not available. Despite this, we show that the estimated central-
ity measures of the banking sector, when also accounting for sectoral exposures within
the domestic economy, perform well as an indicator of risk and vulnerability. This points
to the fact that the position of the banking sector is described by the composition of
both international and national interconnectedness.
15We also test that the difference is statistically significant with standard significance tests for both
the Usefulness and the AUC measures. In the vein of Holopainen and Sarlin (2015), we make use of
the bootstrap approach in Robin et al. (2011) that draws stratified bootstrap replicates from the data,
computes the measures and the difference for each bootstrap replicate, and tests bilateral differences.
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Table 2: Estimates and signaling performance with macro-network measures (all instruments and cen-
trality measures). The table reports the estimates and predictive performance of logit models, of which
Model (1) is the baseline. PCAs - MN - All refer to the PCAs computed over the centrality measures of all
financial instruments for the Macro-Networks. The Usefulness measures reported have optimal thresh-
olds given the specified preferences. Bold entries correspond to the benchmark preferences. Thresholds
are shown for µ = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and the forecast horizon is 24 months. Standard errors are clustered at
the quarter level. Statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels is denoted by ·, ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
respectively.
Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -4.38*** -6.17*** -6.51*** -7.11*** -6.25***
Total assets to GDP 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
Non-core liabilities 12.66 25.50 25.65 33.03· 39.71
Debt to equity 0.04 0.03 0.06· 0.07* 0.03
Debt securities to liabilities 0.54 -1.91 -1.84 -2.14 -5.16·
Mortgages to loans 2.44* 5.01** 4.24** 4.67** 3.22***
Loans to deposits -0.02 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.37
Real GDP 33.39* 38.77* 38.45* 41.09* 41.96**
Inflation 31.44 35.92 36.75· 34.18· 37.15*
Stock prices 0.21 0.39 0.46 0.37 0.73
House prices 4.56 3.91 4.17 2.70 6.13
Long-term gov. yield -18.39 -16.90 -16.27 -11.44 -2.78
Int. investment to GDP -0.01 -0.85** -1.10** -1.45*** -0.69
Government debt to GDP 0.58 1.52** 1.65** 1.84*** 1.94*
Priv. credit flow to GDP 7.51*** 9.74*** 10.03*** 8.73*** 8.99***
PCA 1 - MN - All 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.39*** 0.41***
PCA 2 - MN - All -0.16· -0.19* -0.19*
PCA 3 - MN - All 0.37** 0.37**
PCA 4 - MN - All -0.64**
AUC 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80
Ur(µ)
µ=0.6 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.26
µ=0.7 0.12 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.36
µ=0.8 0.23 0.35 0.37 0.43 0.49
µ=0.9 0.23 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37
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Table 3: Models with cross-border banking network variables. The table reports the estimates and pre-
dictive performance of logit models. The estimates for the banking sector and macro-financial controls
are not reported for brevity. Model 1 is the baseline (see Table 2). PCA - MFI -instrument refers to the
PCA computed separately for each financial instrument on the centrality measures for the corresponding
cross-border banking network. PCAs - MFI - All refer to the PCAs computed over all financial instru-
ments. The Usefulness measures reported have optimal thresholds given the specified preferences. Bold
entries correspond to the benchmark preferences. Thresholds are shown for µ = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and the
forecast horizon is 24 months. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. Statistical significance
at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels is denoted by ·, ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively.
Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PCA 1 - MFI - Loans 0.61***
PCA 1 - MFI - Deposits 0.54***
PCA 1 - MFI - Securities 0.41***
PCA 1 - MFI - Shares 0.35**
PCA 1 - MFI - All 0.34*** 0.35***
PCA 2 - MFI - All -0.35** -0.38**
PCA 3 - MFI - All 0.10 0.10
PCA 4 - MFI - All 0.11
AUC 0.73 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.79
Ur(µ)
µ=0.6 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.17
µ=0.7 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.24
µ=0.8 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.38 0.38
µ=0.9 0.23 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.36
4.3. Early-warning properties of various instruments
Building on the previous approach, we perform PCA on the four centrality measures
(In-Degree, Out-Degree, Betwenness and Closeness) used to quantify the interconnect-
edness of the banking sector within the macro-network. This time, we separately apply
PCA to the instruments loans, deposits, securities and shares. As mentioned earlier, the
motivation for analysing banking sector centrality in these four financial instruments is
to understand the relationship of the banking sector with different types of risks and the
different role played by the banking sector, either as a direct holder or as an intermediary.
There are several important differences across the financial instruments that should
be noted. First, loans and deposits are instrument types for which the banking sector has
traditionally a dominant position, given banks’ role as takers of deposits and granters of
loans vis-a-vis other institutional sectors. Second, loans and deposits are mainly bilateral
direct linkages between the sectors and they are not traded in markets. In contrast, debt
securities and shares are traded in financial markets and have a market price, due to
which banking sectors’ role can be different in these instruments. While the banking
sector can hold securities and shares directly in its portfolio, it can also act as an in-
termediary of these instruments to other institutional sectors. Finally, there is another
important difference across the financial instruments related to issuers of instruments.
While deposits and loans can be received from and granted to most institutional sec-
tors, only certain institutional sectors issue securities and shares (e.g., household and
government sectors do not issue shares, and the household sector does not issue debt se-
curities). This limits the banking sector’s direct risk exposures to certain sectors. As we
mentioned above, different financial instruments can also be used to analyse and proxy
the banking sector’s exposure to different types of risk. First, loans can be seen as mainly
exposing the banking sector to credit risk. Second, the main source of risk of deposits
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Table 4: Models with macro-network variables based on individual instruments. The table reports the
estimates and predictive performance of logit models, of which Model (1) is the baseline. The estimates
for the banking sector and macro-financial controls are not reported for brevity. PCA - MN -intrument
refers to the PCA computed separately for each financial instrument on the centrality measures for
the corresponding macro-network. The Usefulness measures reported have optimal thresholds given the
specified preferences. Bold entries correspond to the benchmark preferences. Thresholds are shown for
µ = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and the forecast horizon is 24 months. See Section 3.3 for further details on the
measures. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. Statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05,
0.01 and 0.001 levels is denoted by ·, ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively.
Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PCA 1 - MN - Loans 0.88***
PCA 1 - MN - Deposits 0.39***
PCA 1 - MN - Securities 0.54***
PCA 1 - MN - Shares 0.38***
AUC 0.73 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.76
Ur(µ)
µ=0.6 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.11
µ=0.7 0.12 0.27 0.15 0.18 0.14
µ=0.8 0.23 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.30
µ=0.9 0.23 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.29
to the banking sector is funding and liquidity risk. Third, securities and shares can be
seen as exposing the banking sector beyond credit and liquidity risk to market risk. One
should note, however, that in systemic banking crises, increased interconnections and
intertwined risks across sectors’ risk categories makes this point less observable.
Again, using PCA for the four groups of financial instruments, we retain components
with eigenvalues greater than one. Thus, we consider only the first component, which
explains a significant proportion of variance. As above, these components are included as
independent variables in our regressions. For PCA on individual instruments, Table B4
(Panel B) shows the standard deviation and the proportion of variance explained (the
coefficients for each component are omitted for brevity). In Table 4, Models 2–5 are
augmented with the principal components for each balance-sheet instrument separately.
The results show that by considering those variables the model performs better than
the initial specification (Baseline), however with some heterogeneity across balance-sheet
instruments. The PCAs of network measures computed on the macro-network for loans
(Model 2) and securities (Model 4) yield slightly more Usefulness than for deposits (Model
3) and shares (Model 5). This points to more vulnerability descending from credit risk
rather than from funding and liquidity risk or market risk.
Interestingly, the positive coefficients of PCAs, irrespectively of the instrument, sug-
gest that a more central position of the banking sector in the macro-network increases
the probability of a banking crisis. Indeed, the loadings of the first principals are al-
ways positive (see Table B4). Hence, to gain further insights we estimate the model
adding one by one all the centrality measures. Table B6 (in Appendix B) confirms a
positive relationship in most of the regressions. Also the Usefulness always improves,
yet with some heterogeneity across instruments confirming the previous results. We ob-
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Table 5: Models with macro-network variables and non-linearity effects. The table reports the estimates
and predictive performance of logit models, of which Model (1) is the baseline. The estimates for the
banking sector and macro-financial controls are not reported for brevity. The PCA 1 refers to the first
PCA computed separately for each financial instrument on the centrality measures for the corresponding
macro-network. In models 1, 3, 5, and 7 PCAs are interacted with dummy variables for high (above
the 75 percentile), medium (between the 75 and the 25 percentile) and low (below the 25 percentile)
level of interconnectedness. In models 2, 4, 6, and 8 PCAs are interacted with dummy variables for high
(above the 50 percentile) and low (below the 50 percentile) level of interconnectedness. The Usefulness
measures reported have optimal thresholds given the specified preferences. Bold entries correspond to
the benchmark preferences. Thresholds are shown for µ = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and the forecast horizon is
24 months. See Section 3.3 for further details on the measures. Standard errors are clustered at the
quarter level. Statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels is denoted by ·, ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗
respectively.
Loans Deposits Securities Shares
Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(PCA 1)*Above p75 1.10*** 0.38** 0.64*** 0.60***
(PCA 1)*Between p25 and p75 2.66*** 2.69*** 3.31*** 3.54***
(PCA 1)*Below p75 0.21 0.38 -0.10 -0.45·
(PCA 1)*Above p50 0.99*** 0.36* 0.56*** 0.39***
(PCA 1)*Below p50 0.68** 0.50· 0.41 0.33
AUC 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.82 0.77 0.81 0.76
Ur(µ)
µ=0.6 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.11
µ=0.7 0.36 0.28 0.21 0.15 0.30 0.18 0.27 0.14
µ=0.8 0.45 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.41 0.32 0.39 0.30
µ=0.9 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.41 0.32 0.40 0.30
serve heterogeneity also across centrality measures, but there is no centrality measure
which is strongly better than the others in all four cases under examination. This was
an additional reason to opt for the PCA approach.
Next, Table 5 addresses concerns related to network threshold effects. To capture
non-linearities we allow PCAs for each instrument to have a different impact for high
and low level of interconnectedness. In one case we consider above the 75th percentile,
between the 75th and the 25th percentile, below the 25 percentile, in another case we
split the sample just above and below the 50 percentile. In models 1, 3, 5 and 7 vari-
ables for high and intermediate level of interconnectedness are statistically significant
while this is not the case for low level of interconnectedness. Evidence of non-linearity
effects are confirmed also by models 2, 4, 6 and 8. These results are verified for all four
instruments confirming the findings of previous works (see e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2015b;
Elliott et al., 2014; Battiston et al., 2012). In terms of model performance, we find that
the introduction of two threshold levels in the network measures improves the relative
Usefulness with respect to a single threshold level or no threshold effect (see Table 4).
We also find that the non-linearity effects of interconnectedness are more pronounced
when using the variables constructed over the macro-network than only the network of
banking sectors. Overall these results underpin the need to account for non-linearities
when studying the relationship between interconnectedness and financial stability.
5. Robustness
In this section, we test the robustness of the above presented benchmark model, as
well as evaluate it in terms of predictive performance in real-time use. Robustness is
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Table 6: Model performance over policymakers’ preferences for the benchmark model. The table reports
results of a logit model with optimal thresholds w.r.t. Usefulness with specific preferences and a forecast
horizon of 24 months. Bold entries correspond to the benchmark preferences. Thresholds λ are calculated
for µ = 0.0, ..., 1.0. The table also reports in columns the following measures: TP = True positives, FP =
False positives, TN= True negatives, FN = False negatives, Precision positives = TP/(TP+FP), Recall
positives = TP/(TP+FN), Precision negatives = TN/(TN+FN), Recall negatives = TN/(TN+FP),
Accuracy = (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN), absolute and relative usefulness Ua and Ur (see formulae
1-3), and AUC = area under the ROC curve (TP rate to FP rate). See Section 3.3 for further details.
Preferences λ TP FP TN FN Positive Negative Accuracy FP rate FN rate Ua(µ) Ur(µ)(%) AUC
Precision Recall Precision Recall
µ=0.0 0.99 7 0 562 89 1.00 0.07 0.86 1.00 0.86 0 0.93 0 - 0.80
µ=0.1 0.99 7 0 562 89 1.00 0.07 0.86 1.00 0.86 0 0.93 0 0.07 0.80
µ=0.2 0.99 7 0 560 89 1.00 0.07 0.86 1.00 0.86 0 0.93 0 0.07 0.80
µ=0.3 0.98 12 2 560 84 0.86 0.12 0.87 1.00 0.87 0 0.88 0 0.08 0.80
µ=0.4 0.98 12 2 560 84 0.86 0.12 0.87 1.00 0.87 0 0.88 0.01 0.09 0.80
µ=0.5 0.88 46 33 531 50 0.58 0.48 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.06 0.52 0.01 0.14 0.80
µ=0.6 0.86 52 41 513 44 0.56 0.54 0.92 0.93 0.87 0.07 0.46 0.02 0.26 0.80
µ=0.7 0.80 64 68 513 32 0.48 0.67 0.94 0.88 0.85 0.12 0.33 0.04 0.36 0.80
µ=0.8 0.80 64 68 497 32 0.48 0.67 0.94 0.88 0.85 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.49 0.80
µ=0.9 0.80 64 68 475 32 0.48 0.67 0.94 0.88 0.85 0.12 0.33 0.03 0.37 0.80
µ=1.0 0 96 562 0 0 0.15 1.00 - 0 0.15 1 0 0 - 0.80
Table 7: Model performance over policymakers’ preferences with a forecast horizon of 12 months. For
definitions of the measures and other details, see Table 6.
Preferences λ TP FP TN FN Positive Negative Accuracy FP rate FN rate Ua(µ) Ur(µ)(%) AUC
Precision Recall Precision Recall
µ=0.0 1.00 0 0 610 48 - 0 0.93 1.00 0.93 0 1.00 0 - 0.79
µ=0.1 1.00 0 0 610 48 - 0 0.93 1.00 0.93 0 1.00 0 0 0.79
µ=0.2 1.00 0 0 610 48 - 0 0.93 1.00 0.93 0 1.00 0 0 0.79
µ=0.3 1.00 0 0 610 48 - 0 0.93 1.00 0.93 0 1.00 0 0 0.79
µ=0.4 1.00 0 0 610 48 - 0 0.93 1.00 0.93 0 1.00 0 0 0.79
µ=0.5 0.98 8 6 604 40 0.57 0.17 0.94 0.99 0.93 0.01 0.83 0 4 0.79
µ=0.6 0.98 8 6 604 40 0.57 0.17 0.94 0.99 0.93 0.01 0.83 0 8 0.79
µ=0.7 0.90 24 42 568 24 0.36 0.50 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.07 0.50 0.01 13 0.79
µ=0.8 0.90 24 42 568 24 0.36 0.50 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.07 0.50 0.02 28 0.79
µ=0.9 0.83 32 80 530 16 0.29 0.67 0.97 0.87 0.85 0.13 0.33 0.03 48 0.79
µ=1.0 0 48 610 0 0 0.07 1.00 - 0 0.07 1.00 0 0 - 0.79
tested with respect to policymakers’ preferences, forecast horizons and thresholds. For
measuring performance, we make use of the evaluation metrics presented in Section 3.4.16
In Table 6, the models are evaluated for policymakers’ preferences ranging from 0.0 to
1.0. While the model is Useful for preferences between 0.2 and 0.9, the table shows that
the model yields more Usefulness to a policymaker that is more concerned about missing
a crisis than giving false alarms. This confirms the findings of Sarlin (2013) and Betz
et al. (2014), which is an inherent property of classification problems with imbalanced
classes and costs. That is, one has to be more concerned about the rare class in order
for a model to yield more Usefulness than the best guess of a policymaker.
In Tables 7 and 8, we test the robustness for forecast horizons of 12 and 36 months.
Following results in Table 6, which highlight the challenge of achieving useful models
on highly imbalanced classes, the difference in the results in Tables 7 and 8 derive
from the impact of forecast horizons on the class-imbalance problem. In general, with a
16In addition to the below tests, that mainly focus on different modeling parameters, we have also
tested robustness to controlling for size effects in the macro-network. All of the main results are confirmed
when scaling the linkages with the logartihm of GDP.
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Table 8: Model performance over policymakers’ preferences with a forecast horizon of 36 months. For
definitions of the measures and other details, see Table 6.
Preferences λ TP FP TN FN Positive Negative Accuracy FP rate FN rate Ua(µ) Ur(µ)(%) AUC
Precision Recall Precision Recall
µ=0.0 0.99 7 0 514 137 1.00 0.05 0.79 1.00 0.79 0 0.95 0 - 0.82
µ=0.1 0.99 7 0 514 137 1.00 0.05 0.79 1.00 0.79 0 0.95 0 5 0.82
µ=0.2 0.99 7 0 514 137 1.00 0.05 0.79 1.00 0.79 0 0.95 0 5 0.82
µ=0.3 0.99 7 0 514 137 1.00 0.05 0.79 1.00 0.79 0 0.95 0 5 0.82
µ=0.4 0.88 53 26 488 91 0.67 0.37 0.84 0.95 0.82 0.05 0.63 0 10 0.82
µ=0.5 0.78 87 58 456 57 0.60 0.60 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.11 0.40 0.02 20 0.82
µ=0.6 0.77 90 62 452 54 0.59 0.62 0.89 0.88 0.82 0.12 0.38 0.04 34 0.82
µ=0.7 0.73 99 79 435 45 0.56 0.69 0.91 0.85 0.81 0.15 0.31 0.07 45 0.82
µ=0.8 0.70 104 94 420 40 0.53 0.72 0.91 0.82 0.80 0.18 0.28 0.08 51 0.82
µ=0.9 0.44 130 239 275 14 0.35 0.90 0.95 0.54 0.62 0.46 0.10 0.02 29 0.82
µ=1.0 0 144 514 0 0 0.22 1.00 - 0 0.22 1.00 0.00 0 - 0.82
short forecast horizon, the rarity of the infrequent class even further increases, whereas a
longer forecast horizon leads to a more balanced distribution of the classes. Hence, while
the model with a forecast horizon of 12 months is Useful for preferences of 0.5 to 0.9,
the model with a horizon of 36 months yields generally larger Usefulness for preferences
ranging between 0.4 and 0.9. Once Ur ≤ 0, as commonly with small µ values, the order
of magnitude is not of importance as the method anyway be outperformed by the best
guess of a policymaker.
Further, we make use of ROC curves for assessing the performance of the models
over all possible thresholds. In principle, this provides an approach to evaluate the
performance of the models for all values of the preference parameter, as the threshold
value is impacted by the used preferences. Yet, due to the fact that the AUC measure
also includes parts of the ROC curve that are less policy relevant (i.e., the threshold
extremes), we only see it as a robustness check. In Figure 3, we can observe that all
of the three models with forecast horizons of 12, 24 and 36 months are well above the
diagonal line, which represents performance when tossing a coin. Likewise, the models
with macro-networks (solid lines) are shown to be well-above the baseline models (dashed
lines). In accordance with its highest AUC value in Tables 6, 7 and 8, Figure 3 also
confirms that the largest area below the ROC curve is for a model with a forecast horizon
of 36 months.
The final test takes the viewpoint of real-time analysis. We use a recursive algorithm
that derives a new model at each quarter using only information available up to that point
in time. This enables testing whether the use of macro-networks would have provided
means for predicting the recent crisis, and whether and to what extent it performs better
than the baseline model. The algorithm proceeds as follows. We estimate a model at each
quarter t with all available information up to that point, evaluate the signals to set an
optimal threshold, and provide an estimate of the current vulnerability of each economy
with the same threshold as on in-sample data. The threshold is thus time-varying. At
the end, we collect all probabilities and thresholds, as well as the signals, and evaluate
how well the model has performed in out-of-sample analysis (i.e., 2005Q2 onward).17
17In addition to recursive estimatinos, we have also tested so-called leave-on-country-out validation,
and found that the models perform well. This is no surprise due to the similar patterns experienced by
European countries prior to this crisis. For brevity these tables have not been included, but are available
upon request.
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Figure 3: ROC curves for models with forecast horizons of 12, 24 and 36 months.
The quasi real-time analysis starts from 2005Q3, which enables to test performance
with no direct prior information on the build-up phase of the recent crisis. Despite
the quasi nature of the real-time tests, the recursive test increases the information set
gradually over time and allows for a fair comparison of models with and without macro-
network-based centrality measures. Table 9 shows model performance for the baseline
model for policymakers’ preferences ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. This implies that model
performance is tested separately for the range of all potential preferences µ with the
Usefulness measure, in addition to also reporting the AUC measure as an aggregate
the range of µ. Overall, the model yields positive Usefulness, and thus indicates that
recursive estimations of the model would have helped in correctly calling the recent crisis
in Europe. It also confirms the above findings on better performance for policymakers
more concerned about missing a crisis, which is in line with previous work on similar
samples (e.g., Betz et al., 2014). Yet, the question we are interested in relates to whether
macro-networks aid in out-of-sample analysis. Table 10 shows that the benchmark model
that includes macro-network measures (model 5 in Table 2) outperforms the baseline
model. This holds for the range of all potential preferences µ (except one) with the
Usefulness measure, as well as shows much larger values for the overall AUC measure.
Finally, to illustrate model output in recursive analysis, Figure B1(b) shows estimated
probabilities and optimal thresholds for Ireland. The model starts signaling in mid-2006,
which is a few quarters later than the in-sample analysis. but still clearly early enough
for macroprudential policy. Accordingly, macro-networks are not only shown to explain
crises, but also provide means for predicting crises in a quasi real-time manner.
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Table 9: Real-time predictions with the baseline model, including no network measures. The table
reports results of real-time analysis with the baseline logit model (including no network measures), for
which thresholds are optimized recursively w.r.t. Usefulness with different preferences and a forecast
horizon of 24 months. Bold entries correspond to the benchmark preferences. Thresholds λ are calculated
for µ = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9. The table also reports in columns the following measures to assess the overall
performance of the models: TP = True positives, FP = False positives, TN= True negatives, FN = False
negatives, Precision positives = TP/(TP+FP), Recall positives = TP/(TP+FN), Precision negatives =
TN/(TN+FN), Recall negatives = TN/(TN+FP), Accuracy = (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN), absolute
and relative usefulness Ua and Ur (see formulae 1-3), and AUC = area under the ROC curve (TP rate
to FP rate). See Section 3.3 for further details on the measures.
Preferences λ TP FP TN FN Positive Negative Accuracy FP rate FN rate Ua(µ) Ur(µ)(%) AUC
Precision Recall Precision Recall
µ=0.0 1.00 3 93 1 0.03 1.00 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.97 0.12 0.00 - 0.74
µ=0.1 1.00 3 93 1 0.03 1.00 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.97 0.12 0.00 -6 0.74
µ=0.2 0.99 3 93 1 0.03 1.00 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.97 0.12 0.00 -1 0.74
µ=0.3 0.99 4 92 2 0.04 0.99 0.67 0.80 0.80 0.01 0.96 0.13 0.00 -1 0.74
µ=0.4 0.99 7 89 2 0.07 0.99 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.01 0.93 0.20 0.00 4 0.74
µ=0.5 0.98 13 83 5 0.14 0.99 0.72 0.81 0.81 0.01 0.86 0.26 0.01 8 0.74
µ=0.6 0.98 26 70 24 0.27 0.93 0.52 0.83 0.80 0.07 0.73 0.27 0.01 10 0.74
µ=0.7 0.92 51 45 41 0.53 0.89 0.55 0.88 0.81 0.11 0.47 0.43 0.05 35 0.74
µ=0.8 0.72 76 20 102 0.79 0.72 0.43 0.93 0.74 0.28 0.21 0.43 0.08 50 0.74
µ=0.9 0.35 86 10 159 0.90 0.57 0.35 0.95 0.63 0.43 0.10 0.38 0.03 32 0.74
µ=1.0 0.00 96 0 365 1.00 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 - 0.74
Table 10: Real-time predictions with the benchmark model, including network measures. For definitions
of the measures and other details, see Table 9.
Preferences λ TP FP TN FN Positive Negative Accuracy FP rate FN rate Ua(µ) Ur(µ)(%) AUC
Precision Recall Precision Recall
µ=0.0 1.00 19 0 366 77 1.00 0.20 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.80 0.00 - 0.8
µ=0.1 1.00 20 1 365 76 0.95 0.21 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.79 0.00 11 0.8
µ=0.2 0.99 29 9 357 67 0.76 0.30 0.84 0.98 0.84 0.02 0.70 0.00 -7 0.8
µ=0.3 0.98 36 10 356 60 0.78 0.38 0.86 0.97 0.85 0.03 0.62 0.01 13 0.8
µ=0.4 0.98 44 15 351 52 0.75 0.46 0.87 0.96 0.85 0.04 0.54 0.02 22 0.8
µ=0.5 0.88 45 25 341 51 0.64 0.47 0.87 0.93 0.84 0.07 0.53 0.02 21 0.8
µ=0.6 0.85 51 57 309 45 0.47 0.53 0.87 0.84 0.78 0.16 0.47 0.02 14 0.8
µ=0.7 0.85 63 60 306 33 0.51 0.66 0.90 0.84 0.80 0.16 0.34 0.06 39 0.8
µ=0.8 0.81 71 80 286 25 0.47 0.74 0.92 0.78 0.77 0.22 0.26 0.08 51 0.8
µ=0.9 0.81 93 110 256 3 0.46 0.97 0.99 0.70 0.76 0.30 0.03 0.05 63 0.8
µ=1.0 0.00 96 366 0 0 0.21 1.00 - 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.8
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6. Conclusions
The global financial crisis underlines the need for novel tools to support macro-
prudential and regulatory policies. The present work is an attempt to bridge the gap
between the literature on early-warning models and financial networks by studying the
role of financial interconnectedness of the banking sector on an impending banking cri-
sis. In particular, we build a macro-network, a stylized representation of the financial
interdependencies for 14 European countries, and augment an early-warning model by
including measures of banking sector centrality as determinants of banking crises. This
framework accounts for the complexity of different types of risk to which the banking
sector is exposed.
Our results suggest that a more central position of the banking sector in the macro-
network increases the probability of a banking crisis. This overall result is also supported
in our analysis of banking sector centrality using various financial instruments (loans,
deposits, securities and shares), which is motivated by understanding the different roles
(direct exposure or intermediary role) and the different types of risks (credit, funding
and liquidity, and market risks) that the banking sector may face. In this context, risks
originated from the lending activities, i.e. credit risk, and to some extent investment
activities through market risk, seem to predict more accurately banking crisis. Further-
more, our findings confirm the importance to consider the cross-border exposures, but
suggest that assessing the role of the banking sector as part of the overall financial and
non-financial system is even more useful. Finally, our results show that early-warning
models augmented with macro-networks outperform traditional models in terms of pre-
dicting recent banking crises in Europe out-of-sample. These results highlight the im-
portance of understanding the financial interconnectedness of the banking sector as well
as augmenting traditional early-warning models for cyclical developments with measures
of cross-sectional interconnectedness. Important avenues for future research are to ex-
plore further the existing linkages between the banking sector and the other non-financial
sectors.
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Appendix A
In section 3.1, we presented the methodology for constructing the macro-networks.
In this appendix, we evaluate the maximum entropy method used to estimate the do-
mestic linkages between sectors and further discuss the relevant features of the stylized
representation of the financial system.
The Euro Area Accounts (EAA) data contains year-end balance sheet information at
sector level for various instruments. As mentioned in the main text, detailed information
of counterparty positions vis-a`-vis other sectors, i.e. bilateral data, is not available.
Thus, the domestic linkages, WD, are estimated using the maximum entropy method.
Recently, some bilateral data has become available for a limited number of countries
and for limited number of instruments (deposits, short-term loans and long-term loans)
for the most recent time periods. The preliminary nature of this data prevents us from
using this information to construct the macro-network. However, it provides means of
evaluating the suitability of the maximum entropy method to estimate the domestic
sectoral linkages. The comparisons are performed on i) the network structure, ii) the
linkages, and iii) the centrality measures.
First, to evaluate the domestic network, we consider a country with a good coverage
of bilateral data (the Netherlands) for the instruments loans, constructed as the sum
of short-term and long-term loans, and deposits. Figure A1 illustrates the estimated
domestic network with the maximum entropy (panel a and c) and with the real network
(panel b and d). To make an accurate comparison we omit estimated linkages to and
from the Rest of the Word sector (ROW) given that they are absent in the real bilateral
data. As can be seen from the Figure, there are some differences in the relative sizes of
linkages. In particular, when looking at the instrument loans, our estimation technique
seems to under-estimate the linkages from banks (MFI) to general government (GOV)
and from other financial intermediaries (OFI) to households (HH), and somewhat over-
estimates the linkage from insurance and pension fund companies (INS) to households
(HH). In case of deposits, the estimation technique seems to over-estimate the linkages
from insurance sector (INS) to banks (MFI). But these differences are not only due to
the limits of our estimation method but also to discrepancies in the two dataset. This
figure shows that overall the topology of the estimated and real networks are similar for
both instruments.
Second, we compare the estimated and the real linkages for instrument loans. In
Figure A2 we plot the real linkages (x-axis) against the estimated linkages (y-axis) for
each country.18 A visual inspection of the figure shows that for most of the countries
points are quite close to the 45-degree line, having the estimated and the actual linkages
differences limited to few percentage points. Ireland does not perform very well due
to the large role played by ROW in the estimated matrix, which affects all the other
linkages.
Third, to compare the estimated and real networks more formally, we calculate cen-
trality measures for both networks. We construct the macro-network with the real data
18Also for this comparison we omit estimated linkages from and to the ROW sector as they are absent
in the bilateral dataset. In addition, given some inconsistency in the two dataset, we have normalized the
linkages for each individual country-quarter, such that the estimated and the real linkages are expressed
as percentages, wDij/W
D and wˆDij/Wˆ
D, respectively.
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(the resulting set of linkages are denoted by W˜ and calculate the centrality measures for
the MFI sectors. Then, using the real data we compute the assets and the liabilities a˜i
and l˜i for each sector i. Then, we apply the maximum entropy algorithm to a˜i and l˜i
to estimate the domestic network (the resulting set of linkages are denoted by Wˆ and
calculate the centrality measures for the MFI sector.19 Finally, we compare the two sets
of centrality measures for the MFI sector. Table A1 shows the banking sector centrality
measures in estimated and real domestic networks. By definition, values of In-Degree
and Out-Degree are the same. Both values of betweenness and closeness are rather sim-
ilar and within the estimated standard deviations. This means that the position of the
banking sector in the example country of the Netherlands does not change substantially
when estimating the linkages instead of using the real network. Overall these results sup-
ports our view that the chosen methodology seems quite reliable in this context. Still,
the macro-network does not include some of the financial relations existing between the
sectors. In particular, we do not model the linkages between the banking sector and the
foreign non-banking sectors. This choice is motivated by the absence of data that could
guide our estimation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a substantial heterogene-
ity across countries in the sectoral composition of banks foreign assets and liabilities (i.e.
Dutch MFI have substantial linkages with other OFI, while for Italian MFI, the major
counterparties are other MFI). Thus, any method could have introduced a substantial
bias in the macro-network or, at least, in some countries. For the same reasons, we
do not model cross-border linkages for non-banking sectors. Finally, the macro-network
is limited to 14 countries. Hence, in this representation, the banking sectors are not
connected with other non-European countries.
19We follow this procedure because the EAA and the real data differ in the assets and the liabilities
of all sectors, i.e. aˆNFC 6= a˜NFC and lˆNFC 6= l˜NFC . This fact explains, to some extent, the differences
in the amount of linkages in Figure A1. As before, the ROW sector is not considered.
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Figure A1: Estimated domestic network vs Real domestic network. The figures illustrate the domestic
network of the Netherlands for loan (upper panel) and deposit instrument (lower panel) at Q1 2012.
Panel (a) and (c) display the estimated network with the maximum entropy method, while panel (b)
and (d) shows the real network based on the bilateral data. The size of arrow shows different weights,
i.e. the volume of transactions between the sectors.
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Figure A2: Estimated vs actual linkages. We plot real linkages (x-axis) against the estimated linkages
(y-axis), expressed in percentages (wDij/W
D and wˆDij/Wˆ
D), for each quarter. The subplots refers to
different countries.
Table A1: Estimated network vs Real Network, instrument loans. The table reports the centrality
measures of the banking sectors computed on the macro-network for instrument loans. In one case the
domestic network of country x is estimated, in the other case the true domestic network is considered.
Centrality measures are averaged over time periods. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness Closeness
Estimated Ŵ 121.51 152.76 495.88 54.95
(3.46) (9.37) (44.99) (4.25)
Real W˜ 121.51 152.76 512.23 57.27
(3.46) (9.37) (45.06) (4.31)
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Appendix B
Table B1: Banking sector centrality measures on the macro-networks. The table reports the centrality
measures of the banking sectors for each country computed on the macro-networks. Centrality measures
are averaged by instruments and time periods.
In-Degree Out-Degree Betweenness Closeness
Austria 110.32 98.15 548.46 35.29
Belgium 127.42 108.92 566.04 36.61
Germany 156.56 148.66 1287.25 44.93
Denmark 129.36 115.96 555.95 38.74
Spain 85.65 81.30 572.55 31.66
Finland 156.08 138.56 900.16 42.17
France 79.57 74.48 552.00 29.41
Great Britain 121.87 116.81 613.74 38.66
Greece 128.68 121.60 629.89 40.11
Ireland 131.64 125.72 654.13 40.24
Italy 107.38 95.99 634.68 34.13
Netherland 117.11 112.64 660.50 36.67
Portugal 116.28 158.46 778.49 46.59
Spain 123.33 114.11 710.90 36.52
Table B2: Measures of network statistics. The table shows the network measures we use in our empirical
exercises. In-Degree (Out-Degree) is the sum of all incoming (outgoing) links that each node has with
other nodes, betweenness measures the number of geodesic paths g that pass through a node and closeness
quantifies how close a vertex is to all other vertices in the graph. Measures are weighted by the amounts
of linkages.
Degree CD(i) =
N∑
j
wαij
Betweenness CB(i) =
gwαij (i)
gwαij
Closeness CC(i) =
N∑
j
[min(
1
(wih)α
+ ...+
1
(whj)α
)]
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Table B4: Centrality Measures for the banking sectors on the macro-networks: Principal Component
Analysis. The table reports the loadings of the PCAs, the standard deviation and the proportion of
explained variance for each balance sheet instrument of the macro-networks. Panel A shows the results
based on the PCA performed over all instruments together (and centrality measures). Panel B shows
the results based on the PCA performed separately over each instrument.
1-Component 2-Component 3-Component 4-Component
PANEL A: All instruments
In-DegreeLOANS 0.21 -0.44 0.21 -0.03
Out-DegreeLOANS 0.30 0.13 0.15 0.02
BetweennessLOANS 0.15 -0.43 -0.11 -0.54
ClosenessLOANS 0.25 0.29 0.06 -0.01
In-DegreeDEPOSITS 0.26 0.09 0.19 -0.12
Out-DegreeDEPOSITS 0.26 -0.23 0.02 0.47
BetweennessDEPOSITS 0.16 -0.28 -0.57 -0.00
ClosenessDEPOSITS 0.26 -0.18 -0.01 0.55
In-DegreeSECURITIES 0.23 -0.28 0.24 -0.30
Out-DegreeSECURITIES 0.27 0.15 0.08 -0.05
BetweennessSECURITIES 0.23 0.20 -0.48 -0.06
ClosenessSECURITIES 0.25 0.24 0.04 -0.08
In-DegreeSHARES 0.26 -0.16 0.09 0.15
Out-DegreeSHARES 0.27 0.13 0.07 -0.06
BetweennessSHARES 0.24 0.12 -0.46 -0.05
ClosenessSHARES 0.27 0.23 0.13 -0.11
St. Dev. 3.07 1.45 1.08 0.90
Proportion of Variance Explained 0.59 0.13 0.07 0.05
PANEL B:Individual instruments
LOANS
In-Degree 0.50 -0.44 0.65 -0.32
Out-Degree 0.55 0.38 0.18 0.70
Betweenness 0.43 -0.58 -0.66 0.15
Closeness 0.49 0.54 -0.30 -0.60
St. Dev. 1.57 1.08 0.51 0.27
Proportion of Variance Explained 0.62 0.29 0.06 0.01
DEPOSITS
In-Degree 0.42 0.68 0.59 -0.00
Out-Degree 0.57 0.00 -0.40 0.71
Betweenness 0.41 -0.72 0.54 -0.01
Closeness 0.56 0.01 -0.42 -0.70
St. Dev. 1.65 0.84 0.71 0.18
Proportion of Variance Explained 0.68 0.17 0.12 0.01
SECURITIES
In-Degree 0.39 -0.85 0.31 0.14
Out-Degree 0.57 0.01 -0.35 -0.73
Betweenness 0.45 0.48 0.74 0.01
Closeness 0.55 0.19 -0.47 0.65
St. Dev. 1.67 0.84 0.66 0.22
Proportion of Variance Explained 0.69 0.17 0.11 0.01
SHARES
In-Degree 0.44 -0.73 -0.51 -0.02
Out-Degree 0.53 0.39 -0.13 0.72
Betweenness 0.48 -0.28 0.82 -0.04
Closeness 0.52 0.47 -0.18 -0.68
St. Dev. 1.71 0.75 0.63 0.29
Proportion of Variance Explained 0.73 0.14 0.09 0.02
Table B5: Banking sector centrality measures on the cross-border banking network: summary statistics.
The table reports the centrality measures of the banking sectors for each country computed on the cross-
border banking network. Centrality measures are averaged by countries and time periods. Standard
deviations in parenthesis.
Loans Deposits Securities Shares All instruments
In-Degree 90.74 94.03 73.54 47.86 76.54
(23.94) (19.70) (24.81) (25.17) (23.41))
Out-Degree 90.74 94.03 73.54 47.86 76.54
(19.92) (21.20) (23.83) (20.16) (21.28)
Betweenness 1.80 1.54 2.62 6.23 3.05
(5.05) (3.62) (6.87) (11.66) (6.81)
Closeness 12.75 12.89 12.56 11.71 12.48
(2.25) (2.36) (2.60) (2.54) (2.44)
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Figure B1: Ireland. We plot predicted probabilities and thresholds for Ireland. The upper panel (lower
panel) refers to the in-sample (out-of-sample) analysis.
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